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Abstract: Harnad (2016) presents an engaging and persuasive argument that stakes out the aims
and domain of the fledgling journal, Animal Sentience. As an inaugural editorial, it does this job
masterfully, but it does so from a perspective that tends to treat mental states in an overly
general manner and that makes hard distinctions between mental and behavioral phenomena. I
argue that when it comes to animal minds, it might be more helpful to think of mental concepts
in a more piecemeal way that also retains the intrinsic relation between mind and behavior.
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In the introduction to his insightful inaugural editorial, Harnad (2016) asks, "What does it mean
to 'have a mind'?" His answer, in part a response to Descartes, is that it "feels like something to
think ... or to be in any other mental state," and that therefore, "Mental states are felt states,
and to have a mind means to have the capacity to feel. In a word: sentience" (Harnad, 2016, p.
3, emphasis in original). Although defining mental states in this manner has the potential to
unify human and nonhuman animal minds and the study thereof, it also poses at least three
challenges.
First, as this position retains the Cartesian split between mind and behavior, it runs the risk of
distorting the process of mental state attribution by assuming we can only be sure about our
own minds but have to rely on inference for the minds of others; however, there is no certainty
per se in the first-person case. Second, it collapses over a variety of differences in our mental
vocabularies and geographies that are often better kept distinct; that is, whereas certain mental
concepts essentially involve feelings, many do not, and furthermore, whereas we have a pretty
good sense of what people mean when they claim they know what an object feels like, it is less
clear what a felt mental state consists of (other than typically being accompanied by a verbal
report or characteristic pattern of behavior as in other mental states). Third, when discussing
mindreading, although it is helpful to know the content of a particular mental state, or whether
one can even be sensibly attributed, it is also relevant to know whether the agents themselves
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understand their own mental life and that of others; although a capacity to feel is surely
required for such understanding, it is not the same thing as it, and it is often useful to
distinguish subjectivity from intersubjectivity.
Harnad's (2016) solution to these challenges seems to mostly lie in language; humans use
languages to express our internal states to others and to understand the mental states of
others; we can also, as language users, often infer the mental lives of others from their
nonverbal behavior. Accordingly, then, the other-minds problem is minimal for humans in
typical circumstances because we rely on our languages, and, particularly, in the case of
nonverbal behavior, presumably also context. Therefore, for Harnad (2016), the problem of
other minds mostly "arises only when speech is not possible and behavior is absent or minimal,
such as in deep sleep or coma or under anaesthesia" (p. 3).
Kiley-Worthington's (2016) commentary takes issue with this characterization and points out
that other animals are not comparable to preverbal or mentally challenged persons, nor are
animals simply controlled by instincts (Wereha & Racine, 2012). However, Kiley-Worthington's
depiction of human language as context independent versus the context-dependent
communication systems in many species tends to make human communication appear far less
contextual than it actually might be, which can encourage us to easily overlook the necessary
relation between mind and behavior no matter what species we might have in mind. I do agree
with Harnad (2016) though that when it comes to the human folk psychological concepts that
we typically import into our discussions of animal mentality, humans are the superior mind
readers overall; it is important to bear in mind though that in many ways we have no choice, as
human observers, but to apply human psychological concepts to nonhuman animals, thereby
reinforcing this superiority.
One way to bring this point to life is to discuss Kiley-Worthington's (2016) use of Clever Hans as
an example of mindreading. The point is well taken and it is indeed clever for a horse to behave
in such a manner; it suggests quite a bit about sensitivity to subtle cues that humans often
overlook. However, as clever as Hans might be, this would likely not pass muster as mindreading
for a developmental psychologist even if performed by the cleverest of nonverbal humans. The
reason is that this example would probably be seen as best explained as a learned association
that does not require any inference about the minds of Clever Hans's audience or his trainer.
Here though, one could argue that the other-minds problem truly takes center stage because if
a behavior counts as mindreading in the right context, then why should it matter what causes
the behavior to be exhibited? This runs the risk of conflating causal and definitional issues in
mental state attribution (Racine, 2015). However, a horse tapping out a response to a math
question is an unusual definition of mindreading and a restricted sense of the concept; we
would probably want to see what else Clever Hans is able to do. Similarly, and less
controversially perhaps, developmental and comparative psychologists continue to argue over
whether pointing gestures, by ape or human, are learned, and the extent to which they index
first order versus second order intentionality (Racine, 2012). How can debates like these be
resolved?
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Harnad's (2016) position is helpful because it reminds us of the grounds for mental state
attribution, which require the right sort of circumstances in the background for the verbal (or
nonverbal) behavior to mean what it does. So, a human infant pointing to request an object
from a caregiver in a typical Western family and a chimpanzee doing the same of a human
caregiver from a cage would both be pointing in the same circumstances, and whatever
mentality this evidences of the agents in question would be granted to both (Leavens & Racine,
2009). Whether human infants do this because of mindreading skills and chimps do it because of
social shaping might be interesting causally, if empirically tractable, but it would not tell us
anything about the degree of mentality exhibited — unless one decides by fiat that anything
that might be acquired instrumentally or through conditioning is less psychologically interesting
(Tomasello, 2014). The problem though is that when the behavioral grounds for the attribution
of some form of understanding are largely identical in human and nonhuman animals, as is the
case in these sorts of request games, then there are no independent grounds for determining
whether a given behavior requires some sort of special representational understanding that is
potentially absent in nonhuman animals (Racine, 2012).
A way of getting around this issue might be to question the utility of the representational
paradigm for nonhuman mentality, which is a move that Kiley-Worthington (2016) could be
seen to imply. Johnson (2001), for example, suggests that a distributed model of cognition might
be more fruitful for characterizing and investigating the mental lives of nonhuman animals.
However, Harnad (2005) reminds us that, "the processes that generate thinking and know-how
are ‘distributed’ within the heads of thinkers, but not across thinkers’ heads" (p. 501). His
conclusion is that "Hence, there is no such thing as distributed cognition.’’ However, perhaps
conceiving of "cognition as a family of interrelated but non-identical activities is helpful here
because it avoids the need to make a dichotomous choice regarding whether or not cognition is
distributed (or extended, situated, etc.)" (Susswein & Racine, 2009, p. 186). And perhaps,
whether or not cognition is literally distributed in the causal sense that Harnad (2005) seems to
mean, it still might be a useful way to characterize some aspects of nonhuman mentality. For,
although other animals seem not to understand more opaque concepts like belief (Tomasello,
2014), more basic concepts like attention or intention, which are more easily made manifest in
nonverbal behavior, might be aptly described in a distributed manner.
Leavens, Racine, and Hopkins (2009) argue that joint attention is such a concept because it
"necessarily requires a history of interaction between two or more subjects, some shared
referent and some particular sociocultural and physical surround" (p. 12). They claim that "joint
attention is paradigmatically a distributed cognitive act." Our claim is a definitional one; this is
what counts as (joint) attention, and understood in this manner it can be useful to describe it as
distributed cognition. It also makes it clear that whatever caused an agent to, for example, point
in the right sort of pointing environment is independent of these definitional issues; to put this
differently and with added strength, we can investigate the causes of joint attentional behavior
because we know what counts as joint attention (Racine & Müller, 2009). As Harnad (2016) also
notes, we can also sometimes attribute mental state concepts by measuring brain activity and
knowing that a particular brain state is correlated to a given mental state. In such a case, for
example, a brain scan or EEG pattern can serve as a new definition for an existing concept;
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again, we know what counts as an understanding of beliefs, and when this part of the brain
lights up we can count it as indexing belief understanding. All of this is good science.
For researchers interested not only in animal sentience but also animal intersubjectivity then,
Harnad's (2016) other-minds challenge is particularly apt. Harnad's solution is also apt; other
animals lack language, which is a primary way in which we express our mental states and
understand them in others. An implication of this though is that sincere first-person reports of
one's state of mind are incorrigible; unlike the third-person case, I cannot doubt my internal
states, I can only express them. Of course, I can lie about my mental states, or can think or feel
something that I do not express; in this sense Harnad is correct that there is always some
problem of other minds. Although Harnad claims that animals, bereft of languages, face a more
severe problem of other minds, he also opens the door to animal mentality by acknowledging
that mental state attribution also involves nonverbal behavior, which, fleshed out a bit more,
includes the context of attribution. In a similar way, Kiley-Worthington (2016) claims that
animals, despite lacking language, do not really face such a problem because their
communication is presumably embedded in mutually understood routines and practices.
I am in sympathy with Kiley-Worthington (2016), but also Harnad (2016) because humans are in
some respects mind readers par excellence by virtue of the fact that human life can involve
complicated forms of representation and intrinsically intersubjective linguistic symbols. I have
also suggested that, at least for mental state attribution, communication is contextual, whether
for human or nonhuman animals. I have argued further that depending on the mental state in
question, human and nonhuman animals might well be at equal footing and that we have a
tendency to elevate the mentality of humans over other animals by conflating the cause and
definition of a mental state concept (Leavens & Racine, 2009; Leavens et al., 2009; Racine,
2012). I have used the term “distributed cognition” to foreground its indexical nature, which
also brings into focus the relation between the background circumstances of behavior and the
attribution of mental state concepts. When mentality is framed in this manner, it is easier to see
when human and nonhuman capacities converge — and where they diverge. However, there
will always be some uncertainty about what is really in an agent's mind, whether a human or
nonhuman animal; that is the nature of mental state concepts. This uncertainly though does not
mean we should give similar patterns of behavior a starkly different meaning. For, it is
behavioral similarity that is the most relevant factor for the attribution of the folk psychological
concepts in this area of research; and, it might be this fact that underlies Harnad's (2016)
observation that, "thanks to our acute mind-reading abilities, we grant the benefit of the doubt
— to some degree — to mammals and birds, because they and their young resemble us (and
especially resemble our young)" (p. 6).
The following quote from Wittgenstein (2009), which in part underscores the pragmatic context
of decisions about what should and should not count as evidence for a particular mental state,
suggests that there are no hard and fast rules here. It also implies that to the extent that we
apply human mental state concepts to animals, it is often in a restricted and more rudimentary
form.
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Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. — One says to oneself: How could one
so much get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing. One might as well ascribe it to a
number! — And now look at a wriggling fly, and at once these difficulties vanish, and
pain seems to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to speak, too
smooth. (§284, emphasis in original)
Why do we resist the application of sensation concepts to a stone? In some ways, it is simple as
the fact that it is in our existing languages and the practices with which they are tied up, it
makes no sense to do so in a literal sense, although perhaps it might in some restricted
metaphorical use. It is not just language though; it is also the fact that humans tend to react
differently to stones than we do to flies and other animals. Harnad's discussion of Descartes's
view of animals provides insight into the ways that these uses and conceptions might change
over historical time and cultural context. However, if it were determined, for example, that
animals did not activate Descartes's mirror neuron system, such an empirical finding would have
little bearing on the use of pain concepts (Racine, Wereha, & Leavens, 2012). Things are
different for flies, argues Wittgenstein, because they have the ability to behave in such a way as
to exhibit what counts, at least roughly or pragmatically, as pain behavior. In most languages
and the practices with which they are tied up, stones are not likely the sorts of objects that can
have sensations; that is, to grasp the meaning of “sensation” is to know that one does not
attribute such a concept to a stone.
Still, one might protest, how do we really know that a wriggling fly is in pain? This objection
comes in large part, I suspect, as a consequence of the Cartesian view of mind; the belief that
we know about our inner states by observing them through introspection, and, derivatively, by
introspectively feeling them in the way that Harnad seems to mean. However, although we can
believe something we later find to be false, we do not typically doubt (or not doubt) our own
mental states because there are no grounds for doubt. By contrast, in the third-person case, we
can and do get it wrong. For example, a human might well be in pain, but choose, stoically, not
to express it linguistically or behaviorally. Similarly, a chimpanzee might well conceal an inner
state from a conspecific in competitive circumstances (Tomasello, 2014). Therefore, from a
point of view that sees mental state attribution as tied up with relevant patterns of behavior,
the question of how we really know that a wriggling fly is in pain can equally be paraphrased,
"Do we have grounds for doubting that a wriggling fly is in pain?" And one could equally ask, "Do
we have reason to think that the wriggling fly is trying to pull one over on us when it exhibits
what we would typically take to be pain behavior?" I take it that the obvious answer is no — and
not because of facts about nervous systems, interesting as they might be, but rather facts about
what counts as pain-behavior (and, for that matter, pretense).
In conclusion, as scientists or laypeople we have little choice but to use our existing languages
and their motley crew of mental state concepts in our attempts to understand the minds of
other animals. Although this makes language an important consideration when theorizing about
animal minds, it should not be understood as a theoretical claim that language is a requirement
for developing mental state concepts. This issue is more about the grounds for mental state
attribution, which, as Harnad (2016) notes in the case of humans often involves language
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because what a person says of, for example, their intentions, desires and beliefs is an expression
of those very states and therefore the best logical evidence for their possession. However, some
mental states can be evidenced on behavioral grounds and these are states we can easily
attribute to other animals. This is not anthropomorphism but rather concept use. Although this
allows us to ascribe shared mentality when justified, for example, in the illustration of joint
attention, as the Clever Hans case suggests, there are still logical limits to how far many human
psychological concepts can be applied. The challenge for those interested in the investigation of
animal subjectivity and intersubjectivity lies in part in applying our existing mental state
concepts in ways that are sensitive to the needs of the scientist, but that do not unintentionally
change their existing fields of meaning (Racine, 2015).
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